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Abstract
Awareness of operational risk has increased greatly in recent years, both at individual ﬁnancial
institutions and for payment, clearing, and settlement systems (PCSS). PCSS consist of networks
of interconnected elements (i.e., central operators, participants, and settlement agents);
operational problems at any one of the key elements have the potential to disrupt the system as a
whole and negatively affect ﬁnancial stability.
The author describes the key features of systemically important PCSS in Canada and the oversight
role of the Bank of Canada with respect to those systems. She also describes one approach that
could be used to assess and manage operational risk in Canadian PCSS.
This approach relies on a consistent deﬁnition of operational risk that can be applied across all
elements of a PCSS. It uses a recent methodology adapted from the management of operational
risk at individual ﬁnancial institutions. This methodology, called the loss-distribution approach,
assesses risk in terms of the potential outcomes of operational events owing to certain risk factors
(such as systems problems, human error, process problems, and external events), their likelihood,
and their frequency.
Once operational risk databases are developed that record the frequency and severity of
operational events, it will be possible to estimate parts of the loss distributions for PCSS. In the
meantime, qualitative analysis provided by operations experts associated with the various
elements of PCSS will be important for judging the potential impact and frequency of events.
In a changing ﬁnancial environment, it is hoped that this methodology could be used to
supplement core aspects of operational risk management, such as sound corporate governance,
internal controls, policies and procedures, knowledgeable people, and robust contingency plans.
JEL classiﬁcation: E44, G21
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial institutions; Payments, clearing and settlements systemsvi
Résumé
La prise en considération du risque opérationnel s’est grandement améliorée ces dernières années
tant chez les institutions ﬁnancières que dans les systèmes de paiement et de règlement. Ces
systèmes se composent de réseaux d’éléments interconnectés (opérateurs centraux, participants et
agents de règlement), et les problèmes opérationnels associés à chacun des éléments clés peuvent
perturber l’ensemble du système et avoir des retombées négatives sur la stabilité ﬁnancière du
pays.
Ce document débute par une description des éléments clés des principaux systèmes canadiens et
un exposé du rôle de surveillance que joue la Banque du Canada dans ce domaine. Puis, l’auteure
expose une méthode pouvant servir à estimer et à gérer le risque opérationnel auxquels les
systèmes de règlement et de compensation sont confrontés au Canada.
L’approche en question repose sur une déﬁnition cohérente du risque opérationnel applicable aux
divers éléments des systèmes de paiement et de règlement. Elle utilise une méthodologie récente
inspirée du mode de gestion du risque opérationnel dans les institutions ﬁnancières. Connue sous
le nom d’approche de distribution des pertes, cette méthode permet d’estimer les risques en
fonction, d’une part,  des conséquences potentielles de situations telles que les problèmes
systémiques, les erreurs humaines, le non-respect de certaines exigences juridiques procédures,
certains événements externes, etc. et, d’autre part, de la probabilité et de la fréquence de ces
situations.
Une fois que seront constituées les bases de données relatives au risque opérationnel, où seront
consignées la fréquence et la gravité des événements d’ordre opérationnel, il sera possible
d’estimer certaines parties de la distribution des pertes subies par les systèmes de paiement et de
règlement. En attendant, il faudra compter sur les analyses qualitatives des experts du secteur
opérationnel pour évaluer l’impact possible et la fréquence des événements affectant les divers
aspects des systèmes de paiement et de règlement.
Dans l’environnement ﬁnancier en pleine évolution d’aujourd’hui, on espère pouvoir mettre cette
méthodologie à contribution pour compléter les éléments de base de la gestion du risque
opérationnel tels que le régime de gestion des sociétés, les contrôles internes, les politiques et
procédures, les compétences du personnel, les plans d’urgence.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E44, G21
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Institutions ﬁnancières; Systèmes de paiement, de compensation et
de règlement1
1. Introduction
Sound management of operational risk in systemically important payment, clearing, and
settlement systems (PCSS) is important for ﬁnancial stability. During the day, PCSS allow
ﬁnancial institutions (and, indirectly, their clients) to exchange payments that are irrevocable and
ﬁnal, settle securities transactions, and ﬁnalize the transfer of funds involved in foreign exchange
transactions. PCSS are networks that underpin much ﬁnancial and economic activity. The
elements of these networks include their operators, participants, and settlement agents.1 One
PCSS may be closely linked to another, so disruptions in one may cause problems for another
domestic or international system.
This paper uses recent advances in the management of operational risk at individual ﬁnancial
institutions to develop a uniﬁed framework that could be used to assess and manage operational
risk in Canadian PCSS that are systemically important. Because PCSS consist of networks of
interconnected elements, many of which are critical to the functioning of these systems as a whole,
a systemic approach provides a different and more robust perspective than when operational risk
is analyzed separately at each element of the network. The repercussions of the 11 September
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States illustrate these connections and the usefulness of taking
an integrated approach to assess operational risk in PCSS and the management of severe
operational events.
Many ﬁnancial institutions are trying to move away from a methodology that examines risk in
individual areas of an institution in isolation towards a method that allows for operational risk in
different areas to be measured objectively (in terms of potential ﬁnancial loss) and integrated
across the entire institution. This paper aims to adapt this approach so that a similar uniﬁed one
can be taken with PCSS. It is more difﬁcult to apply this approach in PCSS because it is not our
intent to measure the consequence of adverse operational events in PCSS in terms of ﬁnancial loss
but in terms of the degree of ﬁnancial instability that they may cause, and this may be difﬁcult or
impossible to quantify. Hence, qualitative judgments will remain important. Nevertheless,
adapting this uniﬁed approach, even if it is based mainly on judgment and estimates rather than
hard data, focuses attention on the systemic aspects of operational risk in PCSS that are of most
1. The infrastructure linking these elements, such as SWIFT messaging systems and power systems, are
alsoimportanttoPCSS.Clientswhouseaﬁnancialinstitutiontotransferfundsandsecuritiescouldbe
considered part of a more broadly deﬁned clearing and settlement network, since they would be
concerned about the operational reliability of systems. This paper, however, islimited to the narrower
deﬁnition just given.2
concern to central banks. Over time, as databases on operational events are built up, a more
empirically focused approach will become possible.
PCSS are a key part of the ﬁnancial infrastructure. Because of their critical function in the
economy, PCSS must be safe, reliable, efﬁcient, and secure. They must operate reliably at critical
times of the day and without sustained periods of disruption, except in the worst possible
scenarios. Serious consequences may arise due to severe disruptions at any element of a PCSS
(operator, participant, or settlement agent). For example, some serious disruptions may prevent a
system operator or a participant from operating from their primary site. The failure of business-
continuity plans designed to allow operations to resume at an alternate site could have serious
consequences. Operational problems in a PCSS may impede the control of, or even exacerbate,
other types of risk (e.g., market, liquidity, or credit risk) in a way that could pose systemic risk.
Participants in a system might incur signiﬁcant losses. Operational problems at a participant in a
PCSS could disrupt the payments and settlement activities of other ﬁnancial institutions in the
system in a way that they cannot anticipate or prevent. This could lead to intraday liquidity
problems or end-of-day settlement delays. Severe operational problems can affect interest rates in
overnight money markets. Operational problems that are extremely severe might halt the
operation of a PCSS for an extended period of time, thereby preventing the exchange of payments
or securities. This could have severe consequences for ﬁnancial stability. Increasingly, operational
disruptions in a national PCSS can have international repercussions.
The operational reliability of Canadian PCSS could affect the volume of some transactions in
PCSS and, in extreme cases, the absolute willingness of economic agents, both domestic and
foreign, to enter into ﬁnancial transactions that ultimately rely on the settlement of Canadian-
dollar assets. This could have a negative impact on the efﬁciency of the ﬁnancial system and of the
Canadian economy.
Traditionally, the management of operational risk in both ﬁnancial institutions and PCSS has
relied on sound corporate governance, internal controls, policies and procedures, knowledgeable
people, and robust contingency plans. These will remain the foundation of operational risk
management. In a rapidly changing world, however, it may be more difﬁcult to adapt procedures
quickly to reﬂect changes in the source of operational risk. Consequently, new tools and processes
are being developed to manage operational risk that will be more forward looking. One purpose of
this paper is to adapt these tools and processes so that they can supplement traditional methods of
assessing and managing operational risk in PCSS.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the key PCSS for payments, securities, and
other transactions in Canada. Section 3 describes the Bank of Canada’s oversight role regarding3
systemically important PCSS in Canada and its link to operational risk. Section 4 explains why
awareness of operational risk has increased. Section 5 describes a process that could be used to
assess and manage operational risk in PCSS. It involves deﬁning, identifying, assessing and
measuring, controlling, mitigating, and monitoring risk. An example is given of how this process
might be implemented. Section 6 evaluates the usefulness of this type of framework for the
overall assessment of operational risk in PCSS.
2. Systemically Important Payment, Clearing, and Settlement
Systems in Canada
Canada has a number of PCSS for payments, securities, and other ﬁnancial instruments. Two
domestic settlement systems are key: (i) the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS), owned and
operated by the Canadian Payments Association (CPA), and (ii) the Debt Clearing Service (DCS),
owned and operated by the Canadian Depository for Securities (CDS).2 The CPA consists of
deposit-taking institutions. In November 2001, legislation came into effect that allows life
insurance companies, securities dealers, and money market mutual funds to be eligible for
membership in the CPA. None of these institutions has joined the CPA to date. The CDS is a
private-sector corporation owned by major Canadian chartered banks, members of the Investment
Dealers Association of Canada, and the Toronto Stock Exchange. About 120 institutions,
including the Bank of Canada, are members of the CDS.
The LVTS provides for the intraday exchange of large-value or time-sensitive payments. Thirteen
deposit-taking institutions as well as the Bank of Canada are direct participants in the LVTS. The
DCS settles Government of Canada securities, most provincial government debt, corporate debt,
other long-term debt, and money market instruments. Both settlement systems are netting
systems. Final settlement of the LVTS occurs at the end of the day, although the system has intra-
day ﬁnality; that is, each payment that passes through the LVTS during the day is ﬁnal and
irrevocable. DCS also settles at the end of the day.
A collateral pool in the LVTS ensures that the system will settle at the end of the day even if the
participant with the largest net debit position fails.3 In the extremely remote possibility of
multiple defaults, and if the collateral pool is not sufﬁcient to absorb losses, the Bank of Canada
guarantees settlement of the system.
2. For a description of the major features of the LVTS, see Dingle (1998). For a brief description of the
features of the DCS, see Freedman (1999). See also the Bank of Canada Web site at http://
www.bankofcanada.ca/.
3. The LVTSsettles at 6:30 p.m.EST each day.4
The DCS settles securities on a transaction-by-transaction basis, but nets associated payment
ﬂows. It settles these payments through the LVTS between 4 and 5 p.m. each day. The risk-
prooﬁng mechanism in the DCS ensures that it is able to settle even if the participant with the
largest net debit position fails.
The LVTS and CDS (and its settlement system, the DCS) are closely linked. End-of-day
settlement of payment obligations in the DCS occurs via payments made through the LVTS. The
CDS is the depository for securities that provides the collateral pledged to the LVTS to support
the intraday exchange of payments. Operational problems in the LVTS may therefore affect the
DCS and vice versa.
In September 2002, an international foreign exchange settlement system called the Continuous
Linked Settlement (CLS) Bank began operations. The CLS Bank is owned by more than sixty
internationally active banks. It settles foreign exchange transactions in seven currencies, including
the Canadian dollar. Because this settlement system ensures the simultaneous ﬁnal settlement of
both sides of a foreign exchange transaction, it will greatly reduce foreign exchange settlement
risk. To accommodate the window of time during which settlement occurs, the LVTS opens at 1 a.m.
for payments processing, rather than its previous opening time of 8 a.m. The DCS hours have
been extended accordingly.4
The CLS Bank concentrates operational risk because its safe operation requires that payments in
domestic payment systems in seven different countries be delivered reliably and within a tight
time frame. Even short-term operational problems in the LVTS, DCS, or at a Canadian participant
in the CLS Bank have the potential to create signiﬁcant consequences for CLS Bank participants.
Canadian ﬁnancial institutions involved in the settlement of CLS Bank transactions are expected
to have reliable systems and procedures and knowledgeable personnel to ensure that payments
can be made on time. To address the risk that CLS Bank payments could be disrupted, the Bank of
Canada has put robust backup measures in place to ensure that payments can be delivered to the
CLS Bank within its time-critical window even if there are operational failures in the LVTS or at
one of the CLS Bank’s Canadian participants.
The Bank of Canada is an important element of Canada’s PCSS because of the essential services
it provides to these systems. This function is in addition to its role as a participant in these systems
and as an overseer of systemically important PCSS. The Bank is the “banker” for the DCS and for
the CLS Bank’s Canadian-dollar operations. It provides accounts for the DCS and the CLS Bank,
receives payments due to them, and sends out payments on behalf of these systems. The Bank is
4. For more on the CLS Bank, seeMiller and Northcott (2002a, b).5
also the settlement agent for the LVTS. This settlement occurs at the end of each day through
transfers of funds in settlement accounts of LVTS participants at the Bank of Canada. The Bank
provides secured advances and collateral administration services to direct participants in the
LVTS in support of their daily operations. The Bank provides liquidity to system participants. It
also provides contingency facilities for certain systems in some circumstances, such as those
related to the CLS Bank that were previously described. Given these critical functions,
operational problems at the Bank of Canada could impede the normal operation, or delay
settlement, of the LVTS, DCS, or the CLS Bank. Therefore, robust contingency arrangements and
escalation procedures are in place at the Bank to deal with any operational difﬁculties that could
arise.
3. Operational Risk and Oversight of Systemically Important
PCSS
The Payment Clearing and Settlement Act (PCSA) gives responsibility for formal oversight of
systemically important PCSS in Canada to the Bank of Canada.5 The LVTS, DCS, and CLS Bank
have been designated under the Act and are subject to oversight by the Bank. In 1997, the Bank
issued Guideline Related to Bank of Canada Oversight Activities under the Payment Clearing and
Settlement Act (Bank of Canada 1997). An updated guideline was issued in November 2002 to
reﬂect recent work of the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems (CPSS), composed of payments experts from the G-10 countries, and the
work of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).
The Bank of Canada’s guideline sets out the minimum standards that designated systems are
expected to meet to adequately control systemic risk. The minimum standards incorporate those
set out in the “Lamfalussy Report” published by the BIS in 1990 (BIS 1990). They are consistent
with the CPSS’s more recent publication, Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment
Systems (BIS 2001a). They also satisfy the joint CPSS/IOSCO study, Recommendations for
Securities Settlement Systems (CPSS/IOSCO 2001). These reports and the Bank of Canada’s
guideline emphasize the importance of managing credit, liquidity, legal, and operational risk in
PCSS. Under the PCSA, the Bank of Canada oversees the Canadian-dollar operations of the CLS
Bank and works with other central banks whose currencies are settled by the CLS Bank. The
Federal Reserve has the lead oversight responsibility for the CLS Bank.
5. For a brief description of the features of this legislation, see Goodlet (1997) and Freedman (1999).6
More speciﬁcally, while the CPA and CDS have primary responsibility for managing operational
risk in the LVTS and DCS, the Bank’s guideline requires designated systems “to ensure the
operational reliability of technical systems and the availability of backup facilities capable of
completing daily processing requirements.” Changes to the rules affecting the LVTS and DCS are
assessed by the Bank for their potential to pose systemic risk and for conforming to the Bank’s
guideline for designated PCSS.
The Ofﬁce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) is responsible for the regulation
of federally chartered ﬁnancial institutions. As part of its supervisory activities, the OSFI requires
these institutions to have sound principles and practices for operational risk management,
including appropriate contingency plans. The PCSA does not give the Bank oversight
responsibilities for individual ﬁnancial institutions that participate in designated PCSS, except to
the extent that problems at an institution are directly related to its participation in the system.6
PCSS operators are expected to monitor participants’ compliance with the system’s operational
rules and guidelines. They are also expected to assess the adequacy of participants’ backup
capabilities that allow them to restore operations quickly in the event of disruptions to their
primary processing operations. The Bank of Canada, in turn, assesses the adequacy of technical
competency standards and the compliance activities of these systems to satisfy itself that sources
of systemic risk are contained. In the case of a participant experiencing frequent operational
problems that affected PCSS, the Bank would draw the OSFI’s attention to the problem. In
extreme situations, where the Governor of the Bank judged that systemic risk in PCSS was not
being adequately controlled, the Governor could issue directives to the system operators or, in
certain circumstances, to the participants in a designated system.
The Bank relies on external audits of the LVTS and DCS to determine the effectiveness of internal
controls in achieving the operational integrity of these systems. The Bank can also require audits
of particular aspects of the LVTS and DCS that are of concern to it as a result of its oversight
responsibilities for systemic risk. Certain essential operations provided by the Bank to support the
LVTS may be reviewed as part of this external audit.
The CDS provides a considerable amount of information regarding its management of operational
risk on its Web site (http://www.cds.ca) and through various publications. It provides information
about the operational reliability of its system relative to performance objectives. Its Report on
6. Forexample,theBankhasnojurisdictionoveraparticipant’scapitaladequacy,themanagementofits
investments,oritsrelationswithitscustomers,eventhoughthesemayaffectitssolvencyandhenceits
ability toparticipate in PCSS.7
Internal Controls and Safeguards sets out its overall risk-management objectives, controls, and
practices, and includes the annual report of its external auditors.
In June 2000, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessed the LVTS and found it to be fully
compliant with the CPSS’s Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (BIS
2001a; IMF 2000). The CPA’s Web site (http://www.cdnpay.ca/eng/home-e.htm) also reports on a
self-assessment with the Core Principles and ﬁnds the LVTS to be fully compliant.
The Bank of Canada monitors the LVTS and DCS on an ongoing basis for intraday operational
problems and end-of-day settlement delays. It notes whether these were generated by problems at
a system participant, by the central system operator, or by the Bank of Canada. Any necessary
follow-up action is taken. The Canadian-dollar operations of the CLS Bank are also monitored
closely.
Over the past decade, much of the attention of overseers of PCSS has focused on the design of
systems to control liquidity and credit risk. Their attention is turning increasingly, in Canada and
abroad, to operational risk. In the past, operational reliability of PCSS has emphasized the ability
of these systems to settle without signiﬁcant delay at the end of the day. More attention is now
being given to the intra-day reliability of these systems.
For example, a recent BIS/IOSCO report (BIS/IOSCO 2001) on securities settlement systems
expands on expectations of operational reliability for major securities settlement systems. The
report indicates that system operators should have a process for identifying and managing
operational risk, whether this risk arises from the central system operator or from participants of
the system. It sets out a series of questions that can be used to assess operational risk (and other
risks) in securities settlement systems as well as assess the use of well-established methods for
determining compliance with operational risk standards (e.g., corporate governance, policies and
procedures, and contingency arrangements). An assessment of the intraday reliability of these
systems requires operators to consider how long it takes to recover operations through backup
systems, how often these are tested, and whether these procedures provide for the preservation of
all transactions data. It is also important for system operators to keep track of how many times a
year a key system has failed, how long it took to resume processing, and whether any transactions
data were lost. The overseers in each country are expected to evaluate the compliance of securities
settlement systems with these procedures.8
4. The Growing Awareness of Operational Risk
Awareness of operational risk has increased sharply in recent years, partly due to well-publicized,
very sizable losses suffered by a number of large ﬁnancial institutions over the past decade as a
result of weaknesses in internal controls. There is a growing recognition that, although the
likelihood is small, the ﬁnancial consequences of such events could be extremely damaging.
The effect of operational risk on the ﬁnancial infrastructure, including PCSS, has also gained
attention. A severe operational problem within a ﬁnancial institution can create problems for
important parts of the ﬁnancial system architecture. A prominent example of such an event is that
of the Bank of New York (BONY), because of the key role it plays in clearing U.S.-dollar
securities. In 1985, a 28-hour computer malfunction prevented BONY from carrying out its
securities-related activities. As a result, BONY needed to borrow a record amount—more than
$20 billion—from the Federal Reserve’s discount window. Other ﬁnancial institutions were left
with a corresponding excess of cash. Their efforts to dispose of this surplus temporarily drove the
federal funds rate down by about 300 basis points.7 Problems at BONY during the events
following 11 September 2001 also contributed to extreme liquidity disruptions and problems in
securities markets in the United States.
In 1990, a ﬁre in New York left a number of buildings in lower Manhattan, including that of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, without power for six days. While ﬁnancial transactions
continued to be processed, severe demands were placed on operations and backup facilities.8
Operational risk in the ﬁnancial infrastructure can also spill over to international markets. In April
2000, a software problem caused trading on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) to stop for almost
eight hours. The London International Futures Exchange, which uses spot prices obtained from
the LSE to value futures contracts, was also affected. The inability to adjust U.K. portfolios was
reported to have caused a number of investors to sell European shares, and prices on European
exchanges fell.9
The realization of operational risk in PCSS may result in market, liquidity, and credit risk
problems. The events following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 affected the entire
ﬁnancial infrastructure in the United States and parts of the infrastructure in Canada and other
countries. Large-value payment systems around the world remained open during that period and
7. Wall Street Journal, 25 November 1985.
8. Corrigan (1996).
9. Wall Street Journal, 6 April 2000.9
the ﬁnancial architecture functioned remarkably well under the circumstances. Nevertheless, the
settlement of bond transactions in the United States was severely disrupted and dislocations in
U.S. payment systems contributed to severe liquidity problems at some institutions. Major stock
exchanges in the United States and Canada closed. The two largest electronic interbank trading
systems for foreign exchange transactions, Reuters and EBS, also closed for a short time due to an
overload of backup systems. In Canada, concern by domestic ﬁnancial institutions that they might
not receive U.S. funds owing to them in a timely fashion (because of potential disruptions in U.S.
payment systems) altered the ﬂow of payments in the LVTS.
The events of 11 September have emphasized the importance of documented, validated, and
tested contingency plans to deal with extreme events. Around the world, operators of PCSS are re-
examining whether contingency plans are robust enough to deal with the consequences of extreme
disruptions of one or more of the critical elements of PCSS.
Operational risk management has gained prominence for other reasons. Change in the ﬁnancial
sector globally has been rapid in the past decade and it will continue in the future. Examples
include globalization (e.g., the CLS Bank), disintermediation, and the increasing complexity of
ﬁnancial instruments. Growing linkages between systems, such as those between large-value
payment systems in currencies settled by the CLS Bank, make the consequences of operational
events in one element of these networks more serious and widespread. In North America, large-
value payment systems and some securities settlement systems are moving towards 24-hour
availability. Technological advances are leading to increasing economies of scale and scope that
inﬂuence many aspects of PCSS. They may reduce the optimal number of direct participants in
PCSS and, indeed, the efﬁcient number of PCSS. As these trends evolve, concentration may
increase and this tends to make more severe the consequences of operational disruptions at one of
the key elements of the ﬁnancial infrastructure. This may require PCSS to invest more resources
to reduce the ﬁnancial system’s vulnerability to this type of shock.
Technological advances can also shift the composition of operational risk. New technologies are
often adopted because of cost considerations rather than because of any expected reduction in
risk. Although advancing technology allows for more straight-through processing and a reduction
in manual intervention, more sophisticated technology may make it more difﬁcult to identify the
nature of operational problems and may take much longer to resolve them when they occur.
Moreover, when these systems fail, it may be far more difﬁcult to rely on manual backup to keep
operations going than for smaller, less complex systems. Disruptions in these more efﬁcient,
integrated systems should occur much less frequently, but their consequences may be more
severe.10
It will likely become increasingly important for many payments and ﬁnancial instruments to be
delivered promptly at speciﬁc times of day. The time-sensitive requirements for payments to the
CLS Bank are a primary example. As this time-criticality grows in importance, it places a much
greater burden on the operational reliability of all elements of PCSS—operators, participants, and
settlement agents.
These changes increase the complexity of operational risk management. As stated earlier,
traditional elements of corporate governance, strong internal controls, policies and procedures,
and knowledgeable people will remain core aspects of operational risk management. However,
the rapidly evolving environment raises the question of whether traditional approaches to
operational risk management can be supplemented by additional measures. Owing to rapid
change, some operational risk mitigants, such as policies and procedures, become less effective
because they are difﬁcult to adjust quickly and to keep up to date. External audits tend to focus on
how well risk-management objectives were met in the recent past, and may provide less valuable
information about how effective operational risk management will be in the changing
environment of the future.
To date, operational risk measurement has relied largely on a “qualitative” and “disaggregated”
approach. Building on advances in modelling credit and market risks, however, many large
ﬁnancial institutions are now starting to develop “quantitative” models that integrate the
assessment of operational risk across a ﬁnancial institution. These models could supplement
qualitative approaches for measuring and managing operational risk. The objective is to determine
whether quantitative approaches can add consistency, objectivity, and rigour in managing
operational risk across all business lines of a ﬁnancial institution. Section 5 describes how one of
these recent approaches could be adapted to analyze operational risk in PCSS.
5. APossibleFrameworkforAssessingandManagingOperational
Risk in PCSS
This section focuses on the systemic aspect of operational risk in PCSS, rather than on the
consequences of operational events for individual participants in PCSS. This systemic perspective
may, therefore, differ from that of a participant in a PCSS, for example.
An approach is described that could be used to assess and manage operational risk in PCSS. It
borrows heavily from the framework set up by the BIS to address the management of operational
risk at individual ﬁnancial institutions. Appendix A summarizes much of the recent work done by
the BIS in operational risk management at individual ﬁnancial institutions.11
Many elements of operational risk can be in common at ﬁnancial institutions or in PCSS, but
some elements differ. A ﬁnancial institution is concerned with the effects of risk on its own
institution. PCSS, however, are interconnected networks. Each participant in a PCSS will have its
own risk-management strategy and practices that it has developed for its own internal risk-
management purposes. Externalities, however, may tend to limit the degree to which one element
(e.g., a participant) of a PCSS looks beyond the effects of operational events on its own business
and considers its systemic consequences for PCSS. It is therefore important that the central
operator of a PCSS sets clear standards that participants must meet to prevent or limit the
consequences of disruptions in their own operations for PCSS as a whole.
In terms of the methodology that we propose, the model for managing operational risk in PCSS
involves deﬁning, identifying, assessing and measuring, controlling and mitigating, and
monitoring operational risk. This methodology is recommended in virtually all recent
publications (including those of the BIS).
5.1 Deﬁning operational risk in PCSS
Following the approach taken by the BIS10 for individual ﬁnancial institutions, operational risk in
PCSS is deﬁned as follows:
The risk resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, systems, human error, or
from external events related to any element of payment, clearing, and settlement systems.
In describing the consequences of operational risk in PCSS, the focus will be on the potential for
ﬁnancial instability when serious problems arise in these systems. The focus of this deﬁnition on
the causes of operational risk (these are also called risk factors) is useful. It provides a direct link
between the causes of operational risk and consequences for PCSS and, therefore, for ﬁnancial
stability, rather than emphasizing the multitude of operational events that are the symptoms of
operational risk. Note that credit-related factors such as the default of a participant are not
considered as one of the causes that can create operational risk.
Many causes of operational disruptions are internal to one or more elements of PCSS
(participants, operators, and settlement agents). For example, systems problems at an LVTS
participant may alter the payment activity of other participants and, thus, the payment system as a
whole. Similarly, a problem caused by human error at the central operator might cause a lengthy
intraday LVTS outage that disrupts the payment activities of all participants. This could
10. TheBISdeﬁnesoperationalriskforaﬁnancialinstitutionas“theriskoflossresultingfrominadequate
or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events” (BIS 2002a).12
signiﬁcantly delay the settlement of the DCS. Conversely, a lengthy delay in settlement of the
DCS could delay settlement of the LVTS. In such a case, the ﬁnality and certainty of settlement is
not at risk because of the design and risk controls of the system. Since the CLS Bank is
operational, however, the consequences of late settlement of the LVTS have intensiﬁed, because it
takes several hours for the LVTS and participants to adjust their computer systems to process
time-critical CLS Bank-related payments early the next morning, when CLS payment trafﬁc is
heavy. Other operational risk factors that can contribute to ﬁnancial instability may be external.
These could include natural disasters (earthquake, ﬁre, ﬂood) at a participant, settlement agent, or
operator of a PCSS.11 The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 are an example of an external
risk factor that affected all elements of PCSS in the United States and many elements of the
ﬁnancial infrastructure in Canada and abroad.
5.2 Identifying operational risk in PCSS
The deﬁnition of operational risk has already set out the risk factors for PCSS. It may, in fact, be
easier to identify operational risk in PCSS than in ﬁnancial institutions. In ﬁnancial institutions,
the dividing line between credit risk, for example, and operational risk may not be clear.12 In
PCSS, these issues do not pose problems, since the primary focus of the operational risk-
management framework for PCSS is related to the effect of risk on ﬁnancial stability.
In identifying operational risk in PCSS, it helps to identify the risk factors that are most important
for preserving the smooth functioning of PCSS (e.g., key systems, processes, and resources). This
helps to set priorities when it comes to measuring, analyzing, and managing operational risk as
well as establishing contingency measures, such as business-continuity plans, to deal with
extreme events. This assessment can be made by operational experts in PCSS who are aware of
the most critical elements of processes, systems, and skills required for successful operations.
These experts may come from the operators of PCSS, their participants, or their settlement agents.
These experts are also well-placed to consider how changes to business procedures or functions
may reduce the level of operational risk. An environmental scan can help to identify potential
changes in external risk factors that originate outside PCSS.
The consequences of adverse operational events in PCSS for ﬁnancial instability are extremely
difﬁcult, and may be impossible, to quantify. The judgment of operational experts can be helpful
in developing a consensus on values that can be used to create an index of “ﬁnancial instability.”
11. See Corrigan (1996).
12. Forexample,institutionsmayvaryinallocatinglossesduetobreachesofcreditlimitstocreditriskor
to operational risk.13
Experts can benchmark the values of this index by assigning a number from 0 to 7, for example, to
measure the consequences of speciﬁc operational events in PCSS. Thus, a one-hour settlement
delay of the DCS might receive a value of 2 and a lengthy intraday outage in the LVTS might
receive a value of 3. A failure to make CLS Bank-related payments might receive a value of 4.
With a few such benchmarks, as operational events occur, it would be easier to rank less
arbitrarily their effects on ﬁnancial instability by considering their consequences relative to the
benchmarks that had already been established. In effect, this approach to identifying operational
risk is similar to an internal risk assessment and also involves qualitative scenario analysis. This
scenario analysis allows experts to assess the consequences of extreme events that have a very low
likelihood of occurring, but it adds some rigour by attempting to compare the severity of different
events on a consistent basis. This is useful to identify areas of risk and to develop appropriate
contingency measures to manage these types of events should they occur.
5.3 Assessing and measuring operational risk in PCSS
One way to implement this methodology for measuring operational risk in PCSS would be to
adapt the loss-distribution approach put forward by the Basel Committee to measure operational
risk in a ﬁnancial institution. The loss distribution captures three elements of risk: the range of
outcomes that may be associated with a single risk factor, the likelihood of each of those
outcomes, and the frequency with which one can expect this risk factor to occur over a particular
horizon. The ﬁrst two elements are captured in the loss-severity distribution (LSD). The third is
captured in a frequency distribution. The LSD and frequency distribution are blended together to
form the loss distribution. When establishing the loss distribution, it would likely be more
effective to base it on the “residual” risk that remains after existing internal controls and other
risk-mitigation measures are taken into account.13
A single risk factor (such as a systems problem) that affects a PCSS can generally be associated
with a continuum of consequences, depending on the circumstances that exist when the problem
occurs and the duration of the problem. In other words, the consequences are almost always
uncertain. Associated with each of these potential outcomes is a likelihood (or probability). This
relationship between possible consequences in terms of the index of financial instability (measured
along the horizontal axis) and their associated likelihoods (along the vertical axis) is the LSD
13. For some purposes, however, the loss distributionbefore all riskmitigants are considered will be
relevant to a central bank. For example, the Bank of Canada provides certain contingency
arrangements toPCSS and their participants in some situations. The Bank would also be interested in
thelikelihood,potentialconsequences,andfrequencyofoperationaleventsbeforetakingintoaccount
the operational support provided as a last resort by the Bank.14
shown in Figure 1. The LSD measures the range of potential outcomes of a single occurrence of a
risk factor and says nothing about the frequency with which this risk factor could occur.
The LSD is not a complete measurement of operational risk. One must also assess the frequency
of the risk factor over a given time horizon (e.g., one year). In almost all cases, the frequency of a
risk factor is also uncertain. This uncertainty is captured by specifying a frequency distribution for
the risk factor (Figure 2). This distribution describes the number of times a risk factor could occur
over a particular horizon together with an associated probability. A frequency distribution often
has the symmetric shape shown in Figure 2. It is generally assumed to be independent of the
LSD.14
Information about the LSD and frequency distributions is valuable in itself. When the LSD and
frequency distribution are combined, the result is the loss distribution, which could have a shape
like that shown in Figure 3. This distribution can be viewed as the complete risk proﬁle of a risk
factor. Aggregating across all risk factors provides an overall loss distribution or operational risk
proﬁle for a PCSS.
Combining the LSD and frequency distributions to obtain a loss distribution is not a simple
process. An analytical loss distribution cannot typically be calculated and, in general, the simplest
way to calculate the loss distribution would be to use a numerical method such as a Monte Carlo
simulation.15 The loss distribution incorporates uncertainty in both the consequences of a single
risk factor and in the frequency of the risk factor.
To illustrate how the loss-distribution approach might be implemented in practice, consider the
risk associated with systems, human error, or process problems at participants of a PCSS. A group
of operational experts in PCSS would already have established an index of ﬁnancial instability as
described in section 5.2. The ﬁrst step in establishing the loss distribution would be to develop a
view on the LSD.
If a database that recorded past operational events existed, it could be used to assess part of the
LSD. The database would contain information on each operational event at participants and its
consequences (i.e., the value of the ﬁnancial instability index). For example, if the database
indicated that, 75 per cent of the time, operational events at participants had an effect on the index
14. If we consider, for example, intraday outages of the LVTS, this statistical independence means
(looselyspeaking)thattherangeofconsequencesweexpecttoseeforasingleoutageisnotinﬂuenced
by the number of outages that occur. One can think of a few counter-examples where this statistical
independenceisnottrue.However,calculationofthelossdistributionbecomesmuchmorecomplexif
this assumption is dropped.
15. See Frachot, Georges, and Roncalli (2001).15
equal to 2, the likelihood associated with a consequence of 2 would be 0.75. If events that had a
consequence of 5 occurred 0.5 per cent of the time, the likelihood associated with a consequence
of 5 would be 0.005. In the absence of such data, operational experts could use their expertise to
judge what these likelihoods were, based on their assessment of factors such as the time of day
that a problem occurred and the duration of the problem. For example, they could consider the
scenarios that would give rise to a consequence of 5, and use their judgment about the conditions
that would be required to generate those scenarios to estimate the associated likelihood.
The next step would be to estimate the frequency distribution. If a database on operational events
existed, the frequency of operational events at participants of PCSS would be available. One could
look at how often problems at participants occurred and how variable those events were from
month to month, to estimate the mean and variance of the frequency distribution. In the absence of
hard data, operational experts could use their general knowledge of how frequent and variable
operational events at participants had been in the past to form a view of this distribution. Monte
Carlo simulations could then be used to generate a loss distribution that combined the LSD and
frequency distribution.
The introduction of CLS operations provides an example of how a loss distribution can shift as
other parts of the ﬁnancial infrastructure evolve. The CLS would initially affect the LSD
associated with operational problems of participants and could also affect the frequency
distribution during the testing phase, before the CLS began live operations.
During the testing phase, the frequency distribution might shift due to inexperience with making
CLS Bank payments during overnight hours. This might make problems at some participants
more frequent and possibly more variable until experience was gained. The CLS Bank maintained
a three-month trial period during which time participants had the opportunity to ensure that their
systems and processes could meet high standards. During this period, and before the start-up of
live operations in September 2002, each CLS settlement member was formally assessed by the
CLS Bank for its ability to meet high operational standards. By the time the CLS began live
operations, one would expect that the frequency distribution would have shifted back to close to
its original proﬁle.
The LSD would certainly potentially be affected once the CLS process was introduced because
failure to make payments to the CLS Bank when due could have fairly serious consequences.
Thus, compared with the period prior to the CLS start-up, the right-hand tail of the LSD would
shift up. Indeed, it was the assessment of the Bank of Canada that the additional risk of these
relatively severe consequences should be reduced by putting in place additional contingency
measures that would allow participants to make payments to the CLS Bank even if their own16
operations failed. These contingency arrangements, which are not intended to substitute for
participants’ own backup procedures but rather for use as a last resort, would shift the loss
distribution back down towards its initial level. Figure 4 illustrates how the loss distribution might
have shifted just before the introduction of the CLS and how it was brought back to an acceptable
proﬁle.
In many ways, the loss-distribution approach is similar to the qualitative scorecards that are
frequently used in the risk literature. The scorecard approach typically assigns low, medium, or
high likelihoods to problems in a business line or activity and low, medium, or high consequences
associated with those problems. The scorecard approach blends a single estimate of the likelihood
of an event and its consequences to form one summary measure of risk. The overall risk is then
mapped into the cell of a matrix that best captures these two aspects. Figure 5 illustrates the
scorecard approach with the circle in the bottom right-hand cell of the risk matrix.
The loss distribution also estimates the likelihood and consequences of an activity or business
line, but it recognizes that consequences are uncertain and each potential consequence is
associated with a given probability (Figure 5). Thus, this approach provides a more disaggregated
estimate about the risk proﬁle associated with operational risk in PCSS and ensures that every
point of the distribution falls within acceptable risk tolerances. The point estimate associated with
a scorecard could be viewed as one way of aggregating all the information captured in the loss
distribution.
5.4 Controlling and mitigating operational risk in PCSS
Loss distributions are endogenous. Recall that loss distribution was deﬁned as the relationship
between cause and consequences after all internal controls and other risk mitigants are taken into
account. The shape of the distribution will therefore depend on how risk is managed. For example,
if effective risk mitigants are put in place to deal with potentially severe outcomes, the right-hand
tail of the distribution will shift down.
Once operational risk has been measured, it must be analyzed to determine what areas of the
distribution fall within acceptable risk tolerances and where risk tolerances are exceeded. By
adopting an integrated approach across all elements of PCSS, one can then identify where gaps
exist along all possible outcomes that originate from any element of PCSS (system operator,
participant, or settlement agent) and prioritize how to address them. Indeed, even when risk falls
within acceptable tolerances, there is a good case for reducing it when the net beneﬁts are
positive. Risk management should address not only current gaps in risk exposures but also
projections of future gaps that may arise as the ﬁnancial environment and domestic and17
international PCSS evolve. A good example is the rigorous analysis, well in advance of the start-
up of operations, designed to ensure that the CLS Bank, its participants, and national payment
systems met operational standards and had robust contingency arrangements.
In PCSS, when gaps exist between actual risk levels and tolerances, there are a number of options
for addressing them, though fewer than for an individual ﬁnancial institution. A ﬁnancial
institution can exit a business, outsource certain functions, insure or hedge some risks in the
market, or invest in stronger risk mitigants. It can also choose to accept a greater degree of
operational risk and hold more capital to protect itself from adverse operational events that cause
ﬁnancial losses.16 Ultimately, in the case of “catastrophic” operational events (e.g., those that
affected Barings Bank in 1995), in the absence of sufﬁcient capital, a ﬁnancial institution would
become insolvent.
On a national scale, “exiting the business” is not an option for PCSS, because they are an essential
part of the ﬁnancial infrastructure and are often unique. The concept of economic capital is not
meaningful in a PCSS as a buffer for operational events. Given the requirement that PCSS must
function effectively, the main tool for managing operational risk in PCSS is to invest resources in
each element of these networks to prevent severe operational events, or to develop contingency
measures that can be used to mitigate their consequences if these events occur. Thus, a PCSS that
manages operational risk effectively might have a loss distribution that is much more tightly
concentrated around less-severe outcomes than that of a ﬁnancial institution.
For a PCSS, some causes of operational risk are controllable. The likelihood of some risk factors
may be reduced. For example, training can reduce the likelihood of human error. Internal controls
can provide a buffer between human or system errors and potentially serious consequences. Risk
mitigants such as robust and regularly tested business-continuity plans can decrease the
consequence of an event (often due to external, uncontrollable events) that renders operations
impossible at a primary site, by allowing them to resume quickly at a backup site. Emergency-
response plans can be used to deal with events that are totally unpredictable and that cannot be
handled fully by existing business-continuity planning. Each element of a PCSS has options for
preventing or mitigating risk. Often, however, the way in which these elements manage events in
an integrated fashion determines how successfully a PCSS can cope with severe operational
stress. Thus, coordinated planning and testing of contingency measures by the critical elements of
PCSS can be very helpful.
16. Regulatory requirements, however, ensure that ﬁnancial institutions holda minimum level of capital.18
Figure 6 shows one way to think about the loss distribution for PCSS. Operational problems at
PCSS participants, at the operators of the systems, or at their settlement agent that have an effect
less than FI1 have a minimal impact on ﬁnancial stability and would not be an important concern.
At the other extreme, the costs of putting in place measures to prevent events that have
consequences in excess of FI2 might be exorbitant. Indeed, because operational risk can never be
driven to zero, it might be impossible to eliminate this residual risk. Rather, if such extremely
remote and unpredictable situations ever occurred, their effects would be managed as events
unfolded via emergency-response plans and any other measures that could be taken at the time to
mitigate the situation.
Thus, the focus for day-to-day sound operational risk management would be on controlling
potential outcomes that fell between FI1 and FI2 and ensuring that the likelihoods associated with
these outcomes were within acceptable risk tolerances. Beyond FI1, the degree of ﬁnancial
instability caused by operational problems in PCSS would become more and more disruptive and
a greater concern. Thus, one would like to see that, as these potential consequences increased, risk
management ensured that the associated likelihoods declined and did not exceed acceptable
tolerances.
5.5 Monitoring operational risk in PCSS
PCSS are more and more dependent on information systems. Technologically effective, up-to-
date, and user-friendly management information systems (MIS) are necessary so that systematic,
comprehensive, objective, timely, and accurate information related to operational risk can be
generated, analyzed, summarized, and reported. The building of databases on operational events
should be a priority.
By building a database with a history of operational events, changing sources of operational risk
are easier to detect. The judgment of experts in the ﬁeld will always remain important for
assessing operational risk, particularly for extreme events that occur infrequently (or may not yet
have occurred). As changes occur in the ﬁnancial environment, as technological innovations
continue, and the complexity of ﬁnancial instruments and of PCSS themselves grow, the risk
factors that give rise to operational risk in PCSS are likely to evolve. By monitoring these changes
using data from the database and by projecting future changes, one can assess the effect that the
changes will have on the loss distribution. These may indicate that the loss distribution for events
with relatively severe consequences in PCSS has shifted upward and that stronger risk mitigants
are needed to bring the risk proﬁle back to acceptable tolerances. An MIS can be used to identify
coincident indicators of operational vulnerabilities and to commence development of leading19
indicators of future operational problems. These systems can also be used to establish performance
indicators and to evaluate how operations perform relative to these metrics. Periodic reports can
be provided that aggregate this information.
6. Conclusion
Awareness of operational risk in PCSS is growing, in Canada and abroad. As PCSS become more
interconnected, successful management of operational risk is growing more important and more
complex.
The framework described above provides a way in which operational risk in PCSS could be
assessed and managed in systemically important Canadian PCSS. PCSS in Canada are owned and
operated by the private sector. Thus, it is their responsibility to ensure that risk brought to these
systems by their operators and participants is managed effectively. And, because of the critical
role the Bank of Canada plays in these systems, risk must also be well-managed at the Bank.
In addition to its oversight responsibility, the Bank may be asked to provide operational assistance
to PCSS or their participants in the event of severe operational disruptions. It is important that
participants and the operators of these systems have in place effective operational risk-management
standards and practices that prevent excessive reliance on the Bank for operational assistance. At
the same time, in the case of extreme events, such as the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,
there is a need for coordination between the Bank and other key elements of PCSS.
The framework described in this paper could provide a uniﬁed and systemic perspective on
operational risk in PCSS and a means of assessing whether operational risk in these systems is
managed in a way that promotes ﬁnancial stability.20
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Figure 1: Loss-Severity Distribution (LSD) of a Single Risk Factor






Figure 3: Loss Distribution











Figure 5: Scorecard Approach




















Appendix A: Recent Regulatory Developments with Respect to
Operational Risk in Financial Institutions
In the past ﬁve years, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of the BIS has focused a
considerable amount of attention on operational risk. In 1999, the Committee surveyed a number
of large ﬁnancial institutions. It found that operational risk awareness had increased signiﬁcantly,
although many banks remained at early stages of developing an operational risk-measurement and
risk-monitoring framework (BIS 1998c). Further surveys in 2000 suggested that attempts by
banks to quantify operational risk were at early stages of development, although many banks had
begun (or will begin in the near future) to collect data, track indicators, and investigate
quantitative approaches to operational risk measurement (BIS 2001c). Most banks—whether
using a purely qualitative approach or developing an approach that adds quantitative elements—
lacked an integrated operational risk-management process; that is, strong corporate-governance
mechanisms, a consistently applied operational risk deﬁnition, data collection, risk assessment
and management, and capital allocation. Many banks, however, revealed a high degree of senior
management commitment to developing a sound, effective, and integrated operational risk-
management framework. These banks anticipate substantial progress in implementing a strong
operational risk-management process over the next few years. To guide banks in this process, the
Basel Committee published Sound Practices for Operational Risk Management in December
2001 (BIS 2001). A revised version was published in July 2002 (BIS 2002a).
In January 2001, the Committee released a draft version of a new Capital Accord. The new
Accord has three pillars, each of which has implications for the management of operational risk.
Current plans are to begin implementing the new Accord at the end of 2006.
The ﬁrst pillar of the new Accord proposes several methods, from relatively simple to more
advanced, for calculating capital charges related to operational risk. The loss-distribution
approach is one of the more advanced approaches that banks may be permitted to use when they
can demonstrate that qualitative aspects of operational risk management are robust and that
measurement of risk exposures is well-founded.1
The second pillar of the new Accord deals with the supervisory review process of the capital
adequacy of ﬁnancial institutions. Part of this review process would be to examine the adequacy
of a bank’s systems for identifying, analyzing, monitoring, and controlling operational risk.
1. Although the loss-distribution approach isrelatively new to the operational risk literature, it has been
used for more than 30 years inthe actuarial sciences.27
The third pillar of the new Accord addresses disclosure of operational risk exposure and
management (as well as disclosure of other types of risk). Views on the optimal level of disclosure
have continued to evolve since the draft of the new Accord was published. A more recent Basel
Committee document, Sound Practices for the Management and Supervision of Operational Risk,
recommends that banks disclose their operational risk-management framework in a way that
allows investors and counterparties to determine whether a bank effectively identiﬁes, assesses,
monitors, and controls operational risk (BIS 2002b). These disclosure elements, if adopted, would
serve as an important additional impetus for ﬁnancial institutions to establish sound operational
risk-management processes.
The Basel Committee recognizes that sound operational risk management requires a sound
conceptual framework and a transparent methodology (BIS 2001). The results of risk
management should be incorporated into decision-making and into day-to-day activities. There
should be ongoing evaluation of risk management relative to objectives, and there should be clear
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